Gender and the Division of Housework
Various economic models play a prominent role in much of the literature on household labor. Although the new home economics' approach, put forward by Becker (1981) , proposes that men and women specialize to maximize household utility or efficiency, the resource-bargaining power perspective focuses on power relations in the family (based on, for example, educational or income differentials between the partners), and the economic dependency model is centered on the assumption that women are "forced" to exchange household labor in return for economic support from a male breadwinner (cf. Brines, 1993; Greenstein, 2000, for example) . These theories are compatible with general formulations of the relative resource hypothesis (a person with higher income will do less housework) and the time availability hypothesis (a person who spends more time in paid work will spend less time in housework), "which are putatively gender neutral, emphasize choice, and assume that housework allocation is governed by the rules and principles of exchange relations" (Coltrane, 2000, p. 1214; see also Shelton & John, 1996, pp. 304ff.) .
However, it has been suggested that "women's employment, time availability, resources, conscious ideology, and power do not account for why wives still do the bulk of family work" (Thompson & Walker, 1989, p. 857) regardless of demographic or life-course characteristics. The partner's gender appears to be so influential that it is often considered to be the single most important determinant of the division of household labor. Theories on socialization-gender role attitudes, for example, contend that people socialized to believe in gender-segregated work will conform to those beliefs (e.g., Coverman, 1985; Cunningham, 2005) . Thus, men and women with traditional attitudes are expected to share less housework, whereas men and women with nontraditional attitudes are expected to share housework more equally. It is assumed that people are automatically socialized into rigid gender roles from childhood onward, going along with the development of relatively fixed attitudes and/or deeply gendered personalities. These strict assumptions are rejected by more recent gender construction theories that incorporate the symbolic and performance dimensions of gender (cf. Shelton & John, 1996) . As Coltrane (2000) posits, "Doing specific household tasks provides opportunities to demonstrate to oneself and to others that one is a competent member of a sex category with the capacity and desire to perform appropriately gendered behaviors" (p. 1213). Thus, housework produces not only household commodities but also gendered identities throughout the life course. Hank, Jürges / Division of Household Labor 401 Gender ideology determines what a proper gender role is. Just as gender ideologies vary across individuals (e.g., Greenstein, 1996) , the social construction of gender is highly context dependent and varies across nations or cultures. Mason (1997) defines the societal gender system as the socially constructed expectations for male and female behavior that are found (in variable form) in every human society. A gender system's expectations prescribe a division of labor and responsibilities between women and men and grant different rights and obligations to them. (p. 158) Resulting macrolevel gender inequalities-that may be promoted or ameliorated by the welfare state (Orloff, 1996 ; see also Geist, 2005 )-materialize in various spheres (cf. Huber, 1990 ) such as the educational system (e.g., Jacobs, 1996) , the labor market (e.g., Chang, 2000) , or the political arena (e.g., Elder, 2004) . Naturally, they are also reflected in spouses' division of work in the family (e.g., Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004; Sundström & Duvander, 2002; Thompson & Walker, 1989) and in the household. Thus, Coltrane (2000) suggests that the almost universally observed pattern of household labor can only be understood by attending to the symbolic significance of household labor in the social construction of gender and by analyzing the social, cultural, economic, and political contexts in which men and women form families, raise children, and sustain households. (p. 1208) Starting from Baxter's (1997) five-country study-covering the United States, Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Australia-a number of studies have explicitly investigated the division of housework in advanced industrialized societies from a cross-national perspective (for an analysis of less developed countries, see, for example, Sanchez, 1993 Sanchez, , 1994 . A universal finding is that wives' contribution to household chores is still greater than their husbands', even in the most egalitarian countries (e.g., Davis & Greenstein, 2004) . More differentiated insights can be derived from recent work using multilevel modeling. For example, Batalova and Cohen (2002) , who focus on the role of premarital cohabitation, show that national cohabitation rates in countries with higher levels of overall gender equality have equalizing effects on couples' division of housework regardless of their own cohabitation experience. Fuwa (2004) elaborates on the role of macrolevel gender inequalities, arguing that "male control over the political economy and male dominated ideologies at the macrolevel may act as 'discount factors' against the power of individual women's resources" (p. 752; see also Blumberg, 1984) . Thus, she expects that individual-level factors will have weaker effects on the division of household labor for women who live in countries with less pronounced gender equality-and vice versa. Using the same data source (the 1994 International Social Survey Programme; ISSP) and selection of 22 countries on which the study by Batalova and Cohen (2002) is based, Fuwa (2004) indeed finds that women living in less egalitarian countries benefit less from their individual assets in the negotiation of housework. This is supported by an analysis of a subset of countries from the 1994 ISSP, which shows that equal sharing of household tasks is particularly rare in countries with a conservative welfare state regime, independent of the partners' relative resources, time availability, or gender ideology (Geist, 2005) . Finally, utilizing the 2002 ISSP on Gender Roles, Stier and LewinEpstein (2005) examine the effects of employment-supportive policies, gender inequalities in the labor market, and general attitudes toward gender roles on households' division of unpaid work in 25 countries. Although it is shown that employment policies have no direct effect on couples' division of labor, the authors' findings suggest that gender inequalities in the labor market and a country's gender ideologies do affect the level of gender equality in the family.
To our knowledge, though, no cross-national research has been carried out yet that pays particular attention to the gendered division of household labor among older couples. Filling in this gap for continental Europe, our study complements recent time-use research that points to significant intergender and intercountry differences in time-use patterns at older ages (cf. Croda & Gonzalez-Chapela, 2005; Gauthier & Smeeding, 2003) . It also adds a European perspective to the so far almost exclusively U.S.-centered literature on the division of housework in later life, particularly after retirement. And finally, it investigates possible interactions between couple characteristics and the household's country of residence in determining patterns of household labor.
Method Data
The data for our study are drawn from the 2004 SHARE (see http://www .share-project.org for more information). The SHARE is modeled closely after the U.S. Health and Retirement Study, and it is the first European data Hank, Jürges / Division of Household Labor 403 set to combine extensive cross-national information about the socioeconomic status, health, and family relationships of the elderly population (see Börsch-Supan et al., 2005) . Release 1 of the data contains information about some 22,000 individuals aged 50 or older from 15,000 households in 10 countries, representing Europe's economic, social, institutional, and cultural diversity from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, including Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France (excluded from our study because of missing macrolevel information), Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Probability samples have been drawn in each participating country; the weighted average household response rate in the face-to-face part of the survey is 62 percent (a thorough description of methodological issues is contained in Börsch-Supan & Jürges, 2005) .
1 Our analytic sample was restricted (a) to respondents living in a marital or nonmarital union at the time of the interview and (b) to couples for whom at least one partner filled out the survey's self-completion questionnaire (which includes the question on which our dependent variable is based). This results in a total of 4,135 observations (see Table 1 for details).
Variables
This article deals with "routine housework" (Coltrane, 2000 (Coltrane, , p. 1210 . The construction of the dependent variable modifies Davis and Greenstein's (2004) measure, taking advantage of the fact that the SHARE provides both partners' assessments of who takes the primary responsibility for routine household chores (see Lee & Waite, 2005 , for a discussion of alternative measures). This is a major improvement over existing data sets such as the ISSP. The (generic) English version of the SHARE questionnaire asks, "Who in the couple takes or took the main responsibility for cooking, cleaning the house, laundry and ironing?" with five answer categories: "myself only," "myself mainly," "myself and my partner equally," "my partner mainly," and "my partner only" (coded 1 through 5). Because this question was posed to both partners, responses were relabeled to distinguish husbands from wives. To account for possible discrepancies in spouses' responses (cf. Kamo, 2000; Lee & Waite, 2005) , we use the mean of their respective answers. This information has been recoded, resulting in a variable ranging from 0 (both partners agree that the wife does all housework) to 1 (both partners agree that the husband does all housework).
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On the right-hand side of the regression, we use a set of standard microlevel explanatory variables including the partners' age, education, (gross) income, 3 employment status, and health, as well as information about the partners' marital status and family responsibilities (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). One advantage of our data is that we have true couple information, that is, individual data for each question asked of each partner. This advantage also complicates matters because each individual variable type enters the analyses twice. Overall, we have thus opted for rather parsimonious but robust specifications. We measure household income by the relative income position in each country. More precisely, we compute country-specific income quintiles, which enter the regression as a set of dummy variables. This has the additional advantage of combining flexibility in functional specification with ease of interpretation. We treat differences in the partners' income as an indicator of relative resources. Relative income of partners is coded as a set of dummy variables for which the baseline category represents couples whose individual income is in the same country-specific (individual) income quintile. Thus, the two dummy variables indicate whether the female partner is in a higher or lower income quintile than the male partner.
Employment status is used as an indicator of time availability. In the SHARE, respondents are asked to self-report employment status by selecting one of the following categories: (a) retired, (b) employed or selfemployed, (c) unemployed, (d) permanently sick or disabled, and (e) homemaker. We code as working all respondents who say they are currently employed or self-employed. The employment status variable is also used to create an indicator for past labor force status (retired), which may have lasting effects for retired couples (see below for a discussion).
Because less traditional gender ideologies have been shown to be closely associated with cohabitation (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Cunningham, 2005; South & Spitze, 1994) , union type is used to account for the gender ideology dimension at the level of couples.
We measure the age (or cohort; this is equivalent in cross-sectional data) of a couple by the average age of both partners. Age differences between partners, which might indicate intracouple power relationships, are also included as control variables. They are measured as the male age minus the female age. Education enters the analysis as one dummy variable for "high" education for each partner, where high education is equivalent to an International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) code of 4 or higher (beyond upper secondary education).
Past and current family responsibilities are measured by the number of children the couple has and by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent said that during the past 12 months, he or she has regularly or occasionally looked after grandchildren without the presence of the parents.
The SHARE contains a large amount of information about the respondents' health status (including specific diagnoses, symptoms, etc.). In the context of our study, we are particularly interested in the effect of healthrelated limitations on daily activities (such as housework). Our health indicator is derived from a global activity limitation question: "For the past 6 months at least, to what extent have you been limited because of a health problem in activities people usually do? (1) severely limited, (2) limited, but not severely, (3) not limited." In the empirical part, we do not distinguish between degrees of limitation.
Our main concern, however, is the role of societal factors in older couples' division of household labor. Like Batalova and Cohen (2002) and Fuwa (2004) , we use the United Nations' gender empowerment measure (GEM; see United Nations Development Program, 2004) as a core measure of macrolevel gender inequalities. The GEM is an index based on the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women, the percentage of female administrators and managers, the percentage of professional and technical workers who are women, and women's share of earnings income. It ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores represent greater levels of empowerment for women. Because the GEM is not available for France, this country was excluded from our analysis.
Analytical Strategy
To investigate the interaction between micro-and macrolevel determinants of older couples' division of household labor, we estimate hierarchical linear models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) . This and similar kinds of multilevel modeling have become a popular alternative to estimating separate models for each country (or other levels of context) in the analysis (see Teachman & Crowder, 2002 , for a review). We follow a stepwise procedure, starting with the "empty" Model 0, which includes no independent variables at all and examines the overall couple-and country-level variances. In Model 1, all couple-level characteristics are entered into the regression with fixed effects across countries. In Model 2, we allow the coefficients of the three main couple-level variables-the male-female income gap, the partners' employment status, and union type-to vary across countries. Finally, Model 3 includes cross-level interactions between the GEM and the intercept as well as the slopes of the three main couple-level variables.
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Empirical Findings
Before presenting our multivariate results, we will briefly discuss two main descriptive findings, displayed in Figure 1 . First, there is an obvious north-south divide in the gender division of labor in the SHARE countries. This is reflected in the distribution of the proportion of couples in which the partners share household tasks equally (including the small number of cases where the husband does more). Although, for example, in Greece and Spain less than 10 percent of couples aged 50 and older exhibit an equal division of labor in the household, this is the case in about 17 percent of Dutch, German, and Swedish couples. The top rank is held by the Danes, where one out of four couples shares core household tasks equally. 4 Second, there is strong indication for a close relationship between the division of household labor among older couples and macrolevel gender inequalities.
5 Plotting the proportion of couples with an equal division of housework against the GEM reveals a clear positive association. The four countries with above average proportions of older couples sharing housework equally-the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark-are also the ones with the highest GEM scores (.8 or more). Similar associations are also found with single items of GEM, such as the proportion of female members of parliament or the female-male wage ratio (details not shown here).
We now turn to the multivariate analysis (see Table 2 ; note that positive coefficients indicate a larger share of the male partner in total housework). In Model 0, the between-country variance of the intercept is statistically significant. The variance components in this empty model suggest that about 10 percent of the overall variance in the division of housework is due to between-country variance (cf. Bryk & Raudensbush, 1992) . A similar order of magnitude is reported in the studies by Fuwa (2004) and Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2005) , for example. Including couple-level variables in Model 1 reduces the variance of country-level intercepts by almost half (from .0030 to .0017) and the couple-level variance by 7 percent (from .0279 to .0259). Turning to our main microlevel explanatory variables, we find an asymmetric effect of relative income: Men with a lower income than their female partners tend to do somewhat more housework than those having about the same income as their partners (where equal income is defined as being in the same income quintile), but the difference is not statistically significant (cf. Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003) . However, if the wife earns less than her husband, the husband's share in household duties is significantly lower than in couples with about equal income. With regard to time availability, we find that men's participation in the labor force also decreases males' participation in household chores, whereas if the female partner engages in paid work, her husband's share of household labor increases. Finally, living in a nonmarital union also increases men's participation in housework strongly, supporting the view that cohabitation goes hand in hand with less traditional gender ideologies.
Both male and female higher education, which is also likely to be positively correlated with less traditional gender ideologies, contributes to a more gender-equal division of housework (e.g., Coltrane, 2000) . Older
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Figure 1 Gender Empowerment Measure and Shares of Couples With Egalitarian Division of Household Labor Across Europe
Note: at = Austria; ch = Switzerland; de = Germany; dk = Denmark; es = Spain; gr = Greece; it = Italy; nl = Netherlands; se = Sweden. Source: SHARE 2004 (Release 1), authors' representation. couples (i.e., those with a higher mean age) exhibit the expected more traditional pattern of housework, whereas the age difference between the partners has no significant effect. Similarly, the coefficients of the dummy variables for different levels of household income turn out to be statistically insignificant. However, there is some indication for a nonlinear relationship between men's participation in household tasks and household income: The negative coefficients for the lowest and highest income quintiles suggest that the contribution of the male partner might be lowest at the upper and lower bounds of the income distribution.
If the woman has retired, her husband's share of household labor increases. At first glance, this might seem to be a surprising result, contradicting findings of previous studies (e.g., Szinovacz, 2000) . In our model, however, the reference category consists of women who are neither gainfully employed nor retired. Because these are mostly housewives, retirement in our model is an indicator of women's previous labor force participation, which is likely to facilitate a somewhat more equal division of housework between the partners even after retirement (assuming continuity in household roles; e.g., Dorfman, 1992) . 6 Male retirement tends to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable, but the respective coefficient is not statistically significant.
Family obligations have an effect on older couples' division of household labor in the senses that an increase in the number of children is associated with a decrease in males' participation in household chores and that men caring for grandchildren also take larger responsibilities within their own households. Limitations by health problems are not significant if they affect men, but they do result in a stronger engagement of the husband in household duties if the female partner's health is limited. As a final couplelevel control variable, we use information about whether only the male or only the female partner answered the question about the division of housework. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kamo, 2000) , men's involvement in household chores is reported to be stronger if the informant is a man himself, whereas it appears to be significantly weaker if only the wife's response is available (see below for further discussion).
Allowing the relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology indicators to vary across countries in Model 2 does not change the coefficients derived from the previous model. The variance components for the slopes of the respective variables are not statistically significant, which means that their effects do not differ by country. Model 3 finally includes the GEM's effect on the intercept and on the slopes of the male-female income gap, the partners' employment status, and union type. The coefficient for the effect of the GEM on the intercept is .1168 and is statistically significant. This means that holding constant microlevel characteristics, men's contribution to housework in more gender-egalitarian countries is substantially larger than elsewhere. Moreover, including the GEM reduces the remaining between-country variance of the intercept by almost 90 percent, from .0017 to .0002! However, as already indicated in Model 2, the coefficients for the main microlevel variables generally do not vary between countries with higher or lower GEM scores. The only exception is the marginally significant effect of the GEM on the slope of the "male income < female income" dummy, suggesting that men in countries with higher values of GEM contribute somewhat more housework if they earn less than their female partner, whereas this is not the case in countries with lower values of GEM.
Following a reviewer's recommendation, we also estimated Model 3 separately for men and women (see appendix). As expected from our own previous findings, the predicted average division of household labor is larger in the male model (.2317) than in the female model (.2031). In particular, the positive association between men's contribution to household chores and cohabitation or health limitations of the female partner appears to be stronger if the interviewee is male. Moreover, the variance of country-level intercepts is larger in the male model (.0018 vs. .0005), pointing to a greater cross-national heterogeneity in men's than in women's responses to the housework question in the SHARE. In contrast to the initial (couple-level) Model 3 and the male model, the positive effect of the GEM on the cohabitation slope is marginally significant if the respondent is female. This finding, however, cannot be considered as sufficiently robust to argue that gender ideology would be more effective in attaining a more egalitarian division of housework in more gender-equal countries.
Discussion
Using microdata from the SHARE, this study is the first to investigate the division of household labor among older couples in a cross-national perspective. Across continental Europe, we find considerable variation in the overall distribution of household labor. One may roughly distinguish between more egalitarian countries in northern Europe, such as Sweden and particularly Denmark, on one hand, and more traditional countries in the southern parts of Europe, above all Spain and Greece, on the other hand. Because we are dealing with cohorts born in 1954 or earlier, it is not surprising to find a generally lower level of men's participation in housework than might have been expected from studies that are representative of the whole population (e.g., Davis & Greenstein, 2004 , p. 1265 .
The outcome of the multivariate analysis suggests an asymmetric, that is, gendered, effect of the partners' relative income. If the wife earns less than her husband, for example, the husband's share in household duties is significantly lower than in couples with about equal income, but there is no statistically significant effect of relative income if the reverse case is considered. Men's participation in the labor force decreases males' participation in household chores, whereas the female partner's engagement in paid work increases her husband's share of household labor. In addition to this support for the time-availability hypothesis, we find evidence that less traditional gender ideologies-indicated by cohabitation and higher educationcontribute to a more gender-equal division of housework. However, our multilevel analysis reveals no country-specific effects of these couple-level characteristics. The latter finding is different from Fuwa (2004) , who provides evidence that relevant microlevel factors have weaker effects on the division of household labor for women who live in countries with less pronounced gender equality. The lack of support for the macrolevel discount factor argument in our study may result from a common baseline level of gender equality in our sample of nine countries, which might be too high to allow the identification of effects such as those revealed in Fuwa's analysis of 22 more diverse nations.
Although our results point to a greater cross-national heterogeneity in men's than in women's responses to the housework question in the SHARE, a general finding is that about half of the between-country variance in the division of housework is due to cross-country differences in couples' characteristics. Still, we find a significant effect of macrolevel gender inequalities on couples' division of housework. Even when controlling for individual characteristics of the household, couples living in countries with higher scores of GEM are more likely to exhibit an equal sharing of household labor (see Figure 1 ). Discussing the mechanisms through which gender empowerment may work, Batalova and Cohen (2002) suggest that "norms about the division of labor may . . . be affected by women's visibility in positions of public authority and prestige" (p. 753). This points to the role of broader cultural mechanisms in shaping cross-national variations in the division of household labor-and although the GEM accounts for a major share of the between-country variance in the distribution of housework, our analysis still points to the presence of (statistically) significant, unobserved macrolevel heterogeneity. Bianchi et al. (2000) conclude that much of the increase in men's share of housework observed in younger U.S. cohorts is because of their increased willingness to perform this labor, which is likely to have resulted from This study has some limitations that call for further research. First and foremost, the current SHARE data allow only a cross-sectional view. That is, we cannot observe actual changes in housework after retirement. Our rough cross-sectional evidence as well as previous U.S. research suggests that such changes tend to be small. However, the magnitude of these changes is likely not only to increase in the future (when new generations of more highly educated women will enter retirement), but also to vary across national contexts. Exploiting such intertemporal and intercountry variations should be a promising field for future research. Second, compared to the ISSP, for example, the sample of countries currently represented in the SHARE is relatively small. In particular, former Socialist societies are yet missing. Future studies of the division of housework among older couples should not only aim at an extension of the spatial and time dimensions of their analyses, though. They should, third, also try at the microlevel to account for complementary productive activities of elders inside and outside their own homes (see Hook, 2004) and at the macrolevel to include indicators that allow development of a better grasp of the cultural factors contributing to the persistence of the gendered division of (household) labor.
8 Although some suggestions in this latter regard have already been put forward (such as national cohabitation rates, used by Batalova & Cohen, 2002) , much more systematic work needs still to be done. 
